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ETHICALLY ECONOMIC: THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT'S
IMPACT ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF HEALTH
BENEFITS
Paul Westfall*
Many see the United States' health-care system as unfair.' A variety
of factors play into this belief, but one that is overlooked is the
administration, implementation, and coverage of health benefits and its
effect on the health-care system. Without a proper determination of health
benefits, the effectiveness and value of a health-care system fails both
ethically and economically. 2
The ethics and economics of the Affordable Care Act (ACA)'
positively affect the administration, implementation, and coverage of
health benefits. This affect can be seen in three areas: essential health
benefits, health insurance exchanges, and the qualified health plans
administered by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Essential
health benefits improve the ethics of health benefits by increasing
participation and consistency, but must include an array of benefits and
Presidential Management Fellow, U.S. Office of Personnel Management; J.D., Seattle University School of
Law; B.S., Psychology, University of Iowa. I would like to thank Dean Mark Niles, Shawn Lipton, and
Stacey Lara-Kerr for giving me this opportunity and for being extremely amenable to my circumstances. In
addition, I would like to thank my family, my friends, and the members of Seattle University Law Review
for always believing in me. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of my own and do
not reflect the policy of the Federal Employee Insurance Operations (a component of "Healthcare and
Insurance" of the Office of Personnel Management), the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, or the
United States Government. All errors are my own.
1. See, e.g., John C. Fletcher, The Bioethics Movement and Hospital Ethics Committees, 50 MD. L. REV.
859, 872 (1991) ("It is unfair to restrict access to health care to those able to pay for it when an individual's
economic opportunity itself depends in great measure on his or her health and educational status."); Loretta
M. Kopelman & Michael G. Palumbo, The U.S. Health Delivery System: Inefficient and Unfair to Children,
23 AM. J.L. & MED. 319 (1997); Julia Lynch & Sarah E. Gollust, Playing Fair:FairnessBeliefs and Health
Policy Preferences in the United States, 35 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 849, 870 (2010) ("More than 70
percent of Americans think inequalities in quality of care or access to health care are fundamentally unfair,
regardless of the social group affected by these inequalities."); David Orentlicher, DestructuringDisability:
Rationing of Health Care and Unfair DiscriminationAgainst the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 49
(1996).
2. Matthew K. Wynia et al., Improving Fairness in Coverage Decisions: Performance Expectationsfor
Quality Improvement, 4 AM. J. BIOETHICS 87, 88 (2004) ("[D]ifficult health care coverage decisions w[ill]
always have to be made, and that trust in the legitimacy of these decisions is required for the health care
system to be most effective and valuable.").
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). The article
discusses both the ACA and the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program in detail because of the
interrelation between the two topics, e.g., Section 1334 of the ACA, and the need to have background
knowledge of the FEHBP to understand the argument that the ACA is both economical and ethical.
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cost-sharing levels in order to counter potential economic self-interest.
Health insurance exchanges improve the ethics of health benefits by
providing consistency, by increasing participation to consult with
stakeholders, and by being transparent in cost reporting. The exchanges
also potentially lower costs, but may be hindered by the self-interest of
insurers. 4 The OPM-administered qualified health plans (hereinafter OPM
plans) will be created in the likeness of the Federal Employee Health
Benefits Program (FEHBP).' The FEHBP has its positives and potential
pitfalls, but overall having the OPM plans in the exchange will bring
stability and lower start-up administrative costs. In the end, these plans
will be subject to adverse selection and risk adjustment-much like the
FEHBP plans-however, tax credits and potential risk-adjustment models
may be used to lessen their impact.
Part I of this Article will discuss how ethics and economics play a
vital role in the administration of health benefits; what can happen when
political punditry hijacks the administration of health benefits; and what
can be done to alleviate these situations. Next, Part II of the Article
explores the Affordable Care Act's impact on health benefits both
ethically and economically in terms of "essential health benefits" and the
health insurance exchanges. The ACA also requires the OPM to create at
least two qualified health plans comparable to the FEHBP. In Part III, the
article will discuss the FEHBP, its strengths, and its weaknesses. Finally,
Part IV examines the OPM plans looking at additional economical
advantages, some potential ethical and economical problems, what OPM
can learn from past exchanges' failures, and recommendations going
forward.
I. THE ADMINISTRATION OF HEALTH BENEFITS
The package design for health benefits6 and the administration of
health benefits' are vital to health-care delivery.' They involve the
4. See infra text accompanying notes 152-68.
5. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1334(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
6. "Benefits design is the decision-making process that determines what assortment of health care services
will be covered under an insurance package." Id. Package design includes three parts: enumerated benefits,
enumerated exclusions, and payer coverage decisions. Lynn Shapiro Snyder, Clayton Nix & Lesley Yeung,
The Importance of Stakeholder Participation in the Process to Define the 'Essential Health Benefits
Package,BNA HEALTH INSURANCE REPORT, Jan. 5, 2010, at 3. Enumerated benefits are covered benefits
if medically necessary. Id. Enumerated exclusions are benefits that are not covered, such as custodial care.
Id. Payer coverage decisions are how a health plan decides when to cover or not a procedure or service
does not fall into either of the above two categories. Id
7. "Benefits administration" is the "decision-making process that determines the insurance coverage of
specific services for specific individuals within the scope and limitations of the benefits design." Wynia et
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interaction of numerous stakeholders: insurance companies and agents,
human resources, health-care providers, and enrollees. 9 In choosing the
range of services to be covered, decisions on what benefits to include must
be made.'o These decisions need to be not only fair but also economical."
This section explores the ethics and the economics of health benefit
administration, what happens when political punditry runs amok with
potential benefits, and what can be done to counter the political punditry
and to show that ethics and economics are not mutually exclusive in the
world of health benefits.
A. Ethics
"Ethics" can have many definitions and meanings.' 2 This article uses
"ethics" as a guide to moral principles rather than as a moral duty or
obligation. While many may wish for the government to have a charitybased model of health care (grounded in moral obligation)," it is clearly
more based on a social-insurance model (grounded in principles).' The
American Medical Association's Ethical Force Program" highlights five
al., supra note 2.
8. Id.
9. Id
10. Id. at 89.
11. Id.
12. Merriam-Webster's defines "ethic" as "the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with
moral duty and obligation," "a set of moral principles," "a theory or system of moral values," "the
principles of conduct governing an individual or a group," "a guiding philosophy," "a consciousness of
moral importance," and "a set of moral issues or aspects (as rightness)." Ethics, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ethics?show-0&t-1306623512 (last visited June 11,
2011).
13. A charity model is based on whatever moral obligation the country owes to its citizens. See Richard E.
Levy, Of Two Minds: Charitableand Social Insurance Models in the Veterans Benefits System, 13 KAN. J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 303, 303 (2004). "[T]he fulfillment of that responsibility is . .. a voluntary undertaking."
Id. The model is not favored because as "mere gratuities," these benefits could be revoked at any time
because of the lack of legal protections. Id. at 304.
14. A social insurance model involves benefits being in the "form of [a] social contract through which the
government uses its taxing and spending powers to spread the costs of old age, disability, unemployment,
and poverty." Id. at 303-04. Prime examples are Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families. Id. at 303. As "quasi-contractual," these benefits are not "mere gratuities
to be distributed in an ad hoc and discretionary manner." Id. at 306. Thus, "the distribution of benefits [i]s
not a discretionary act" and [is] legally protectable. Id.; see also Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(holding that welfare benefits are a protected property interest).
15. The Ethical Force Program is tasked with the "challenge of developing health care system-wide
performance measures for ethics. Featuring representatives from groups including patients, practitioners,
health plans, purchasers, government and accrediting organizations, this program seeks to develop
meaningful solutions that can arise only when a diverse and collaborative group of relevant stakeholders
work
together."
The Ethical Force Program, AM.
MED. Ass'N,
http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/the-ethical-force-program.page (last visited May 28,
2011).
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core ethical principles that should be taken into consideration when
making the decision on what benefits to cover: (1) transparency,16 (2)
participation," (3) equity and consistency,'" (4) sensitivity to value,1 9 and
(5) compassion. 20 These criteria lay an ethical framework upon the
administration of benefits and provide a "best practices" for the designing
of an ethical benefits program. Although all five are important, this article
will briefly discuss three: transparency, participation, and equity and
consistency.21
First, transparency includes the "importance of being honest" and the
"desire to hold both individuals and organization accountable for their
decisions."22 Individual consumers need access to accurate information
about benefit-coverage decisions; otherwise, it is unfair to hold them
accountable for decisions based on specific benefit package design.23
Transparency also involves knowledge of which individuals are involved
in any decision-making process and "requires active attention."24
Second, participation is ethical because it allows the consumer ability
to participate, which in turn allows the consumer "to recognize and leave
poor-quality organizations."25 Having strong participation is especially
important in the health-care context because the ability to participate can
be constrained and it may be impossible to leave a poor-quality benefit
plan.26 In addition, the communication of all stakeholders can help
16. See infra text accompanying notes 22-24.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 25-28.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 29-32.
19. Sensitivity to value involves looking at "net health outcomes of services or technologies ... and the
resources required to achieve these outcomes." Wynia et al., supra note 2, at 92. In other words, this
principle looks to find a health plan that offers more benefits and costs the same as other health plans. Id.
The Ethical Force Program calls for a two-step process for analyzing this criteria: (1) "estimat[e] the
clinical outcomes associated with the service or technology in question [by] assessing the potential benefits,
harms, and risks" and (2) "incorporate[e] information about costs and preferences ... to determine whether
benefits outweigh harms and justify costs for a specific population or patient." Id. at 92-93. The second
step could involve a cost-effective analysis. Id. at 93. Although cost-effective analysis has its advantages,
it can be biased, expensive, outdated, and can undervalue "compassion, equity, and equality of
opportunity." Id. at 94. Thus, in order to remain ethical, the second step must allow for benefit-coverage
determinations that look towards the individual and not just the population base. Id. at 94-95.
20. Compassion requires that health benefits be "flexible, responsive to individual values and priorities,
and attentive to those with critical needs and special vulnerabilities." Id. at 95.
21. These three principles will be furthered examined and used when discussing essential health benefits,
health exchanges, and the OPM-created qualified health plans. See infra Parts II-IV.
22. Wynia et al., supra note 2, at 90.
23. Id.
24. Id. ("All enrollees/beneficiaries should receive a statement explaining the goals of coverage, defining
who is included in the covered population, and describing the process used and types of rationales that may
be taken into account in making individual coverage decisions.").
25. Id. at 91.
26. Id. at 91.
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"discover alliances" between certain stakeholders who previously did not
trust or communicate with each other.27 Yet, having all of the stakeholders
properly represented could "skew[ ] [to] those already empowered and can
leave minority groups susceptible to the effects of majority rule,
marginalizing those with significant but unpopular health concerns."28
Third, with consistency, the administration of health benefits should
ethically result "in similar decisions under similar circumstances."29
Benefits administration should not be different due to "rigged, capricious,
or otherwise discriminatory" actions.30 So, the coverage of benefits should
be concise, clear, and easy to interpret." However, this consistency may
"hinder progress" such that innovative, more expensive, and more efficient
procedures are not utilized properly.3 2
An ethical framework for the administration of health benefits will
increase quality management and improvement in the health-care system."
Demonstrating as many of the above five principles as possible in the
administration of benefits will lead towards a more ethical approach in
health care. Granted, a "business case" can be made on fairness grounds
alone by "promot[ing] customer satisfaction," "reduc[ing] [the] risk of
lawsuit," and "retain[ing] plan members,"34 but cost and cost control must
be considered in order to have a sustainable administration of benefits.
The following section discusses the costs and economics of health
benefits.
B. Economics
Economics, unlike ethics, is fairly definable: "[A] social science
concerned chiefly with description and analysis of the production,
distribution, and consumption of goods and services."" Economically
speaking the health-care system is unlike any other: "the health care
product is ill-defined, the outcome of care is uncertain, large segments of
the industry are dominated by nonprofit providers, and payments are made

27. Id.
28. Id. at 97.
29. Id. at 91.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 97.
33. See id. at 97-98.
34. Id. at 89.
WEBSTER
MERRIAM
35. Economics,
webster.com/dictionary/economics?show-0&t=13067724

39

http://www.merriamONLINE,
(last visited June 11,2011).
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by third parties such as the government and private insurers."" What
makes the health-care system unique is the presence and combination of
all these factors." This section looks at the costs of health care, how they
are paid for, and how they relate to health benefits; at the ways to control
costs via benefits administration; and at economic self-interest.
In 2009, the United States health-care expenditures reached $2.5
trillion, which is about 17.5% of the Gross National Product or $8,086 per
person.38 These costs can be broken down into four major categories:
professional services,3 retail outlet of medical products,40 government
administration and net cost of private health insurance, 41 and hospital
investments. 42 These costs, in turn, are paid for by numerous sources:
private health insurance 43 pays for about 32% of the costs, Medicare pays
about 20%, Medicaid pays about 15%, out-of-pocket expenses pays about
12%, and other insurance and third-party payers4 pay about 21%.45 Both
36. Michael A. Morrisey, Health Care, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2008),
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/HealthCare.html.
37. Id.
38. National Health Expenditures 2009 Highlights 2, CTRS. MEDICAID & MEDICARE SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf
39. Professional services include hospital care, health-care provider and clinical services, home health, and
nursing care facilities. National Health Expenditure Data (2009), CTRS. MEDICAID & MEDICARE SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf [hereinafter NHE Web Tables].
Professional services account for nearly 71% of health expenditures. Id. A majority of these expenses are
due to chronic-disease management and the aging of the U.S. population. U.S. Health Care Costs,
KAISEREDU.ORG
(2010), http://www.kaiseredu.org/Issue-Modules/US-Health-Care-Costs/BackgroundBrief.aspx.
40. Retail outlets of medical products include prescription drugs, durable medical equipment, and other
non-durable medical equipment. NHE Web Tables, supra note 39.
41. Government administration includes the costs of running the multiple federal and state program and
any public health activities. Id. The net cost of private health insurance is the "difference between
premiums eamed by insurers and the claims of losses incurred for which insurers become liable."
at
4
(2009),
&
MEDICARE
SERVS.,
Definitions,
CTRS.
MEDICAID
Combining both public and
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/dsm-09.pdf
private expenses makes sense because policies and practices of the public sector affect the cost transfer to
the private. Gary T. McIlroy, Health Care Cost Containment in the 1980s, 15 COMP. & BENEFITS REVIEW
15, 16 (1983).
42. Investments include research, structures, and equipment. NHE Web Tables, supra note 39. Currently,
the United States is going through a hospital construction "boom," with hospitals following populations out
to the suburbs where the most individuals with private insurance are located. Lynn Cook, Sick in
Suburbia? There's a Hospital Near You,
HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, May
13,
2008,
Carol M. Ostrom, Today's
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/realestate/5774725.html;
Hospital: Spacious, Single Rooms, Talking Beds, SEATTLE TIMES, May
30, 2011,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2015190815_modemhospital3 Im.html.
43. In looking at Private Health Insurance in 2009, $802.1 billion was collected in premiums, which paid
for $712.2 in expenditures. NHE Web Tables, supra note 39. This leaves $89 billion in "net cost," which
includes "administrative costs, . . . additions to reserves, rate credits and dividends, premium taxes, and
plan profits and losses." Definitions,supra note 41, at 24. While this number may seem like a lot, net cost
is down 9.1% from 2008 (or about $8.9 billion). NHE Web Tables, supra note 39,
44. Some examples of the "others" category includes worker's compensation, general assistance programs,
Children's Health Insurance Program, and other federal, state, and local programs. Id.
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public and private health insurances, which pay for over two-thirds of the
above costs, administer health benefits. Benefit package design and
benefit administration are set up by different payment systems-fee for
service, bundled or episode-based, capitated, salary based, and
performance-based-that determines what benefits will be paid for or
covered.46 The amount of what is being paid for is determined by the
payment rate.47 Generally, payment rate is determined by negotiation in
the private sector48 and by administration in the public sector. 49 The
relationship between private and public sector payment rates vary widely,
5 especially in geographic terms."
Controlling costs through benefits administration occurs (1) through
benefit package design in general and (2) through incentivizing prevention
techniques.5 2

45. Id.
46. Factors Affecting the Supply and Prices of Health Care Services (2008), CBO.GOV,
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9924/Chapter5.9.I.shtml.
47. Id.
48. "Payment rates in the private sector are generally set by negotiation [between health plans and
providers], reflecting the underlying costs of the services and the relative bargaining power of providers
and health plans." Id. The negotiations may either be explicit, face-to-face bargaining or tacit, where the
insurer sets the rates to ensure an adequate pool to spread risk. Id.
49. Government programs, such as Medicare:
Generally pay[] doctors and hospitals a fixed amount per service or per admission. Although the scope of
the payments differs substantially between those two payment systems, the mechanisms for setting payment
rates have many similarities. In both cases, a base or average payment amount is multiplied by a factor that
is designed to capture differences in the resources needed to provide various services or to treat different
types of patients. The base payment amount is updated annually according to statutory formulas, but that
update may be-and often is-modified by legislation.
Id,
50. Payment rates are generally split up into two sides: physician services and hospital payments. See id
The private sector and some state-and-local public-sector insurance programs base their payment rate for
physician services on a factor or multiplier of Medicare's fee schedule. Id. On average, Medicare's
payment rates are about 20 percent lower than private sector rates. Id. Medicaid's rates are "about 30
percent lower than Medicare's rates." Id (footnote omitted). Hospital care has similar results. Id.
("Medicare's average payment rates for inpatient care were about 30 percent lower than those of private
insurers in 2006, and that the payments by Medicaid were about 5 percent lower than those of Medicare.")
(footnote omitted).
5 1. Geographically, "Medicare's rates are established nationally and are adjusted to account for geographic
variation in providers' input costs." Id. Private sector insurers have more negotiating power and leverage
where providers are more scarce i.e. rural areas and small cities. Id. Private insurance plans pay "30
percent higher than Medicare's rates in small metro-politan areas and rural areas, 10 percent higher in
medium-sized metropolitan areas, and I percent higher in large metropolitan areas." Id. (footnote omitted).
What makes this outcome exponentially worse is that the "higher spending on health care in certain
geographical areas does not correspond to better health outcomes." U.S. Health Care Costs, supra note 38.
Individuals are paying more money and receiving the same or worse level of care. Ethically, it's
inconsistent.
52. Outside the scope of this article are other ways to control costs such as investing in information
technology, adjusting provider compensation, and altering tax credits for employer-insured plans. US.
Health Care Costs, supranote 38.
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First, benefit package design can affect the administration benefits
from either the consumer or supplier side. From the consumer side,
employers prefer a design that has the ability to share and transfer cost
with its employees." By increasing deductibles or implementing higher
copayments, it indirectly decreases benefit utilization." If a service is not
provided, no cost occurs.
A design, however, that tries to directly control utilization fails. 5
Direct control involves only allowing a certain number of visits a year or
rewarding the use of a different type of medical service (e.g., having
outpatient surgery rather than inpatient surgery or having a surgery at an
ambulatory surgical center rather than at a large, urban hospital).56 Direct
programs fail because the costs for the cheaper second options "gradually
rise" to traditional benefit programs." In addition, "[e]mployees do not
know how to exercise [these options] adequately.""
As a
patient/consumer, employees rely on the physician's/supplier's advice as
to what type of service to use over the employee's financial best interests.
Furthermore, the physician may have his or her own financial best
interests in mind in either a direct or indirect benefit program. From the
supplier side, decreasing the payment rate of a health services generally
decreases the amount of service providing in hospitals, home health
agencies, and skilled nursing facilities.o Physician services have more of
a mixed track record, with the majority of studies finding that the decrease
in payment rate actually increased the amount of service provided."
Second, preventing illness saves money.62 A majority of illnesses
result from people's health habits and are "controllable and preventable."63
53. McIlroy, supranote 41, at 29.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 30.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. CBO.GOV, supra note 46.
61. Id. ("An analysis of Medicare payments conducted by CBO in 2007 ... found that physicians
responded to recent reductions . . . by increasing the reported volume and intensity of the services they
deliver. In particular, that study concluded that the response of physicians offsets about a quarter of the
reduction in spending that would otherwise occur.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
62. McIlroy, supranote 41, at 30 (discussing how lifestyle choices can cause illnesses which, in turn, leads
to increase cost); see also New Medicare Preventive Benefits Begin, HEALTHCARE.GOV (Mar. 16, 2011),
http://www.healthcare.gov/law/resources/reports/prevention03162011a.html
(stating that if all seniors
received pneumococcal infection it would reduce health care costs by S 1 billion a year).
63. McIlroy, supranote 41, at 31; see also U.S. Health Care Costs, supra note 36 ("The burden of chronic
diseases, such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease, has risen dramatically; both of these chronic
conditions are known to be correlated with obesity, smoking, and diet, and are very expensive to treat over
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Having a benefit program that "identifjies] the current medical claims cost
attributable to specific health habits" can help tailor an employer's
wellness program to reduce specific costs.' In addition, having a benefits
program with financial incentives for prevention visits to the doctor and
for workers who engage in a wellness program can help allay costs.65 A
recent example of the benefits of prevention comes from the ACA:
Medicare beneficiaries no longer have to pay anything out of pocket for
many preventive services, such as mammograms, cancer screenings,
smoking and tobacco use cessation counseling,66 and a new annual
wellness visit. 7 In the first two months of 2011, over 150,000 Medicare
beneficiaries received a free annual wellness visit.68 Additionally, Health
and Human Services predicts that premiums will now be lower for
employers, state Medicaid, and Medigap6 insurances that previously filled
this coverage gap in preventive services in Medicare.
The economic self-interest of these over 150,000 beneficiaries is
pretty clear: Being provided a free supply with no cost. Consumers, in
general, have a strong self-interest in both their health and their wallet.
Market efficiency is achieved when insurers compete for customers based
on price and quality of the health plan. 72 Thus, a proper economic model
"relies on well-informed consumers making value-based purchasing
long periods of time.").
64. McIlroy, supra note 41, at 31
65. See HEALTHCARE.GOV, supra note 62. But see U.S. Health Care Costs, supra note 38 ("[I]t is unclear
how much prevention programs will decrease costs, since paradoxically healthier people will likely liveand use the health system-longer.").
66. HEALTHCARE.GOV, supra note 62 ("Includes up to 8 face-to-face visits in a 12-month period but only
if the beneficiary is diagnosed with an illness caused or complicated by tobacco use, or takes a medicine
that is affected by tobacco.").
67. Id. ("During the annual wellness visit, doctors and beneficiaries can develop and/or update a
personalized prevention plan that takes into account medical and family history, detection of any cognitive
impairment, potential (risk factors) for depression, and review of the individual's functional ability and
level of safety.").
68. Id.
69. Medigap, a type of private insurance, fills coverage gaps that Medicare does not cover and can cover
other expenses like copayments and deductibles. Ultimate Guide to Retirement: What is Medigap
CNNMONEY,
Insurance?,
http://money.cnn.com/retirement/guide/insurance health.moneymag/indexl8.htm (last visited May 30,
2011).
70. HEALTHCARE.GOV, supra note 62.
71. Ming Tai-Seale, Does Consumer Satisfaction Information matter? Evidence on Member Retention in
FEHBP Plans, 61 MED. CARE RESEARCH & REVIEW 171, 172 (2004) (describing how consumers switch to
lower cost health plans to save money) (citations omitted). Due to the recession, nearly three-quarters of
patients surveyed took steps to cut medical costs including switching to generic prescriptions or not filling
prescriptions, not going to the doctor when sick, and delaying or deciding against recommended treatment.
Ways Patients are Cutting Health Care Costs, AM. MED. ASS'N, June 29, 2009, http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2009/06/29/bicbO629.htm.
72. Tai-Seale, supra note 71, at 171-72
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decisions when choosing health insurance plans."73 When consumers are
well-informed on their plans and other available plans, employees are
"more likely to withdraw" from their current plan and switch to plans that
better meet their needs.74 Favoring themselves over others, this movement
causes adverse selection and the death spiral to some health plans."
Additionally, insurance companies have their own self interest
demonstrated by their contractual language of "medically necessary"
procedures and their outright denial of benefits, such as custodial care
benefits." Health-care providers have their own self-interest too, which
can be seen by physicians increasing the rate of billing when benefit
reimbursement goes down" and trade associations' previous ability to
manipulate coding language." This ability created a body of codes that
did not "support evidence-based and consumer-driven benefit plan design,
utilization, [or] clinical practice management[.]" 79
C. The Gavrilo Princip of Death Panels
This section describes what happens when political punditry comes
into play and hijacks morality, which, in turn, trumps both ethics and
economics leaving proper benefit payments at the wayside by examining
the dreaded "Death Panels" of the Affordable Care Act.
Originally a part of the ACA,so "Advanced Care Planning
Consultation"" would financially incentivize physicians to voluntarily
73. Id. at 171.
74. Id. at 182 (This research article evaluated the amount of information received from OPM to federal
employees regarding health plans. It measured the years 1994 and 1995.) These years matter because in
1995 OPM freely disseminated report cards to all employees as opposed to just benefit manages and some
employees. Id at 173. In relation to ethics, allowing a consumer ability to participate allows the consumer
"to recognize and leave poor-quality organizations." Wynia, supranote 2.
75. See infra text accompany notes 217-24 for a description and application of adverse selection to the
FEHBP.
76. Steven E. Singer, Ethical Considerations in Health Care Benefits Administration, 14 BENEFITS
QUARTERLY 24, 25-28 (1998).
77. CBO.GOV, supra note 46 ("An analysis of Medicare payments conducted by CBO in 2007 . .. found
that physicians responded to recent reductions . . . by increasing the reported volume and intensity of the
services they deliver. In particular, that study concluded that the response of physicians offsets about a
quarterof the reduction in spending that would otherwise occur.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
78. Synthia L. Molina, ABC Codes: An Essential Tool for Health Benefit Cost Management and
Consumer-Driven Health Plans, 36 CoMP. & BENEFITS REVIEW 71, 72 (2004). At one point "coding was
largely overseen by medical and dental trade associations predisposed to restrict access and payment to
competing practitioners[,]" such as chiropractors and acupuncturists. Id. The only data available "to
support the financing, administration, and delivery of care [was] directed by physicians[.] [H]ealth plans
avoided offering these alternative medicine, nursing, and other integrative health care interventions." Id
79. Id. at 73.
80. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
81. H.R. 3200, 111 th Cong. § 1233 (2009).

2011]

ETHICALLY ECONOMIC

109

discuss end-of-life options with patients by creating a Medicare
reimbursement code for a consultation.8 2 It would have involved
explaining advance directives, living wills, durable power of attorney,
health-care proxies, and the continuum of services offered at the end-oflife from full resuscitation to palliative care." The consultation code never
made it to President Obama for his signature because it became
"politically toxic and widely misunderstood as creating bureaucraticallyadministered government death panels.""
The powder keg of political punditry was filled by Betsy McCaughey
on Fred Thompson's radio show," Rush Limbaugh,8 6 John Boehner," and
Virginia Foxx." On August 7, 2009, Republican nominee for Vice
President, Sarah Palin, lit the fuse by posting a note on Facebook:
The America I know and love is not one in which my parents or
my baby with Down Syndrome will have to stand in front of
Obama's "death panel" so his bureaucrats can decide, based on
a subjective judgment of their "level of productivity in society,"
82. Id.; Joshua E. Perry, A Missed Opportunity: Health Care Reform, Rhetoric, Ethics and Economics at
the End ofLife, 29 Miss. C. L. Rev. 409,413-14 (2010).
83. See generally H.R. 3200, §1233.
84. Perry, supranote 82, at 410-11.
85. On July 16, 2009, Ms. McCaughey, former lieutenant governor of New York, stated that the health
care reform bill "would make it mandatory - absolutely require - that every five years people in
Medicare have a required counseling session that will tell them how to end their life sooner." McCaughey
claims end-of-life counseling will be required for Medicare patients, POLITIFACT, July 23, 2009,
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2009/Jul/23/betsy-mccaughey/mecaughey-claims-endlife-counseling-will-be-requi/. Politifact gave Ms. McCaughey a "Pants on Fire" rating for her statement.
Id.
86. On July 21, 2009, Rush Limbaugh stated:
Mandatory counseling for all seniors at a minimum of every five years, more often if the seasoned citizen is
sick or in a nursing home. .. . That's an invasion of the right to privacy. We can't have counseling for
mothers who are thinking of terminating their pregnancy, but we can go in there and counsel people about
to die. im sure you could get some counselors from the Hemlock Society to go in and do this. Kevorkian
might want to come back to life and handle this. End-of-life counselors, end-of-life treatment for senior
citizens, mandatory.
Dastardly ObamacarePlan Seeks Government Control of Life, Death, The Rush Limbaugh Show (Premier
Radio
Networks
radio
broadcast
July
21,
2009)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_072109/content/01125114.guest.html.). Kevorkian actually
died on June 3, 2011, nearly two years after Rush's radio address. Howard Chua-Eoan, The Life and
Deaths
of
Jack
Kevorkian,
TIME,
June,
3,
2011,
available
at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2075644,00.html.
87. On July 23, 2009, John Boehner, then House Minority Leader, released a statement: "This provision
may start us down a treacherous path toward government-encouraged euthanasia if enacted into law." 'Endof-Life'
Counseling Intensifies Health Care Debate, FOXNEWS.COM,
Aug.
8, 2010,
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/08/08/end-life-counseling-intensifies-health-care-debate/.
88. On July 28, 2009, Representative Virginia Foxx, Republican from North Carolina, addressed the House
about a Republican proposal to health-care reform that is "pro-life because it will not put seniors in a
position of being put to death by their government." 155 Cong. Rec. H8891-06 (daily ed. July 28, 2009)
(statement of Rep. Foxx).
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Such a system is

Thirty percent of individuals polled about a week after that Palin's
statement thought that the new health-care reform included a provision for
death panels.90 Forty-seven percent of the Republicans and forty-five
percent of individuals who watched Fox News thought that the new reform
included death panels. 9' By mid-October the provision was dropped by
House Democrats92 because "death panels" became "emotionally charged
rhetoric" of "political posturing and moral sloganeering."9 3 Additionally,
the strong moral belief that "money should not matter when life and death
are on the line" and that "any form of health care 'rationing' may convey a
disrespect for human life" played a heavy role in the demise of the
consultation code.94
This punditry left behind the ethics and economics of administration
of health benefits. By allowing reimbursement to physicians for these
end-of-life discussions, quality of life can be improved and costs can be
lowered.
Ethically, end-of-life care can be invasive.95 Participation from the
patient and communication between the patient and physician are
important.96 Unfortunately, communication in the health-care system is
undervalued and underfunded. 97 When physicians and patients had end-oflife communications, the patients received more passive care (e.g., hospice

89. Sarah Palin, Statement on the Current Health Care Debate, FACEBOOK (Aug. 7, 2009, 1:26 PM),
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note-id=113851103434. Additionally, "level of productivity of
society" does not appear anywhere in the original House Bill. See generally H.R. 3200, 11Ith Cong.
§ 1233 (2009).
90. Death Panels Live On With Fox Viewers, PEW RESEARCH CTR., (Aug. 20, 2009), available at
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1319/death-panels-republicans-fox-viewers
91. Id.
92. Perry, supra note 82, at 412.
93. Id. at 419, 421.
94. Id at 425 (citations omitted).
95. Id.; Alexi 1. Wright, et al., Associations Between End-of-Life Discussions, Patient Mental Health,
Medical Care Near Death, and Caregiver Bereavement Analysis, 300 JAMA 1665, 1665 (2008); Baohui
Zhang, et al., Health Care Costs in the Last Week ofLife: Associations with End-of-Life Conversations, 169
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 480, 480 (2009) (citing aggressive end-of-life procedure such as mechanical
ventilator use and full-code resuscitation).
96. Perry, supra note 82, at 423-24; Wright et al., supranote 95, at 1670 (finding that patients who did not
have end-of-life discussions with their physicians "received significantly more aggressive medical care . . .
with worse patient quality at the end of life" and worse bereavement adjustment for caregivers); see also
Wynia et al., supra note 2, at 91.
97. Perry, supranote 82, at 424. When Medicare beneficiaries were given a chance to have a free wellness
consultation, over 150,000 beneficiaries participated in two months. HEALTHCARE.GOV, supra notes 6570.
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or respite care) and an increase in patient quality of life."
Economically, end-of-life care is costly.99 Having end-of-life
discussions decreases those end-of-life costs by thirty-five percent because
the discussions lead to less invasive and less costly procedures."oo When
you economically incentivize communication, ethical participation can
occur between physicians and patients, and economic costs can be cut.' '
In the future, to avoid this type of hijacking of morality---especially
when both ethics and economics coincide-politicians need to strike a
balance on how individuals frame health care. Viewing health care as a
market commodity is inconsistent with the efforts to use legislation and
regulations to extend health care to all.102 Specifically, portraying death
panels as a market commodity-i.e., as a cost-cutting measure-portrays
the government as a harsh,"' disciplinarian punisher.'04 Liberals needed to
evoke values of cooperation and mutual aid, a morality of empathy for
others and responsibility for oneself and others.'
Overall, health insurance and the administration of benefits should be
framed as providing "a mechanism for pooling our premium dollars so that
health care will be available when we need it because no one has the
private resources to fund a lifetime of health care on their own."' 6 Thus,
"[c]reating and maintaining a first-class health care system requires us all
to contribute, as we are able, to the costs of health care." 0 7 This type of
framing will appeal more to the Sarah Palins of the world because it
identifies with a broader base of moral judgments,' namely, loyalty and
98. Wright et al., supra note 95, at 1670.
99. Approximately five percent of Medicare patients die every year. A.E. Bamato et al., Trends in
Inpatient Treatment Intensity Among Medicare Beneficiaries at the End of Life, 39 HEALTH SERVS.
RESEARCH 363, 364 (2004). Moreover, in the final year of life, about a third of medical costs are expensed
in the last thirty days with seventy-eight percent of those costs relating to acute care. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et
al., Managed Care, Hospice Use, Site of Death, and Medical Expenditures in the Last Year of Life 162
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1722, 1725 (2002).

100. Zhang, et al., supra note 95, at 482. In addition, those who had higher medical costs in the final week
of life had more physical distress. Id at 482, 484.
101. See generally Perry, supra note 82, at 421-25.
102. Sidney D. Watson, Metaphors, Meaning, and Health Reform, 54 ST. Louts U.L.J. 1313, 1327 (2010).
103. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Comparing Ryan's Medicare Plan to What Congress Gets, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX
BLOG, Apr. 18, 2011, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/18/comparing-ryans-medicare-plan-towhat-congress-gets/ ("Politicians and elected officials appear to have concluded from years of experience
that the public has never favored those who tell them the harsh truth. It's almost as though the public wants
to be misled.").
104. Watson, supra note 102; Reinhardt, supra note 103.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Colin Prince, Comment, Moral Foundation Theory and the Law, 33 SEATTLE U.L. 1293, 1294
(2010).
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respect.
II. AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
ACA was passed in March of 2010 with both great fanfare and
disgust.109 Of the over 1,000 pages of the Act, this section only discusses
two parts: "essential health benefits" and "health insurance exchanges"
with a focus on ethical and economic issues.
A. Essential Health Benefits
Section 1302 of the ACA requires that the state health insurance
exchanges meet a baseline of "essential health benefits" found in a typical
employer plan.'
The definition of essential health benefits is at the
discretion of the Department of Health and Human Services, but broadly,
it must have ten listed categories."' These categories are a "fundamental
change" in benefit coverage in the United States because the government
has never "mandated such a comprehensive set of insurance benefits be
included in insurance coverage."" 2 Defining these categories will be one
of the "most consequential" provisions" 3 and will have a "great[ ] impact
on consumers."" 4 It will also involve a balancing between ethics and
economics. "

109. See, e.g., Erza Klein, The State of Health Care Reform on Law's First Anniversary, PRESS
DEMOCRAT, Mar. 22, 2010, http://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/20110322/wire/110329862?p=3&tc=pg;
Health Care Bill's Passage is Only the Beginning, SUN SENTINEL (Editorial), Mar. 23, 2010,
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-03-23/news/fl-dlyons-editorial-health-care-reform3220100323 1 health-care-reform-bottom-line; Robert Pear, Health Law Waivers Draw Kudos, and
Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/health/policy/20health.html
110. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1302(b)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
111. Id. § 1302(b)(1). The ten categories are the following: "[a]mbulatory patient services," "[e]mergency
services," "[h]ospitalization," "[m]aternity and newborn care," [m]ental health and substance use disorder
services," "[p]rescription drugs," "[r]ehabilitative and habilitative services and devices," "[I]aboratory
services," "[p]reventive and wellness services and chronic disease management," and "[p]ediatric services,
including oral and vision care." Id. § 1302(b)(1)(A)-(1)(J).
112. Geri Aston, Defining Essential Benefits: How Much is Too Much?, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 4, 2011,
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2011/04/04/gvsaO4O4.htm
(quoting Jonathan
Gruber, Ph.D.,
economics professor at MIT).
113. Id.
114. Troy J. Oechsner & Magda Schaler-Haynes, Keeping it Simple: Health Plan Benefit Standardization
and Regulatory Choice Under the Affordable CareAct, 74 ALB. L. REv. 241, 287 (2011).
115. See Aston, supra note 112 (quoting John Ball, MD, chair of the Institute of Medicine committee in
charge of helping HHS define EHB: "Part of what we're looking at is how do you bring appropriate balance
to generosity [ethics] and affordability [economics].").
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1. Ethics
Ethically, participation and consistency are the most important
principles. Participation is important for "all of the stakeholders of health
reform.""' Therefore, the process, i.e., notice and comment rulemaking, in
defining essential health benefits must be "inclusive, transparent, and
efficient.""' Public comment should be meaningful in response to any
proposed rule and should also include "open forums and public
hearings."" Having a full, open process could help "avoid replacing the
political maelstrom of Congress with an executive branch maelstrom."" 9
Consistency concerns exist because the definition of essential health
benefits "does not specify the degree to which benefits must be uniform
between the basic levels of coverage, or even within a basic level of
coverage."' 20 Potentially, individuals in the same circumstance could be
treated in different ways.12 In addition, decisions will also need to made
as to when to cover a "group's need to have [a] new or traditionally
noncovered procedures paid for by insurance." 22
2. Economics
Economically, self-interest is playing a large role in defining the
scope of "essential health benefits" for consumers, health-care providers,
and employers. Consumers want the most coverage and the cheapest
price, but covering rare procedures that have high costs will not meet the
"majority's need to keep premiums affordable." 23
Medical associations, such as the American Academy of Pediatrics
and the American Society of Plastic Surgery, testified at hearings that
essential health benefits should cover their procedures.124 These specific
116. Snyder, Nix & Yeung, supra note 5, at 2.
117. Id.; Transparency is also one of the Ethical Force Programs' principles. Supra notes 22-24 &
accompany text.
118. Snyder, Nix & Yeung, supra note 5, at 2.
119. Id.
120. Oechsner & Schaler-Haynes, supra note 114, at 290; see, e.g., Rachel L. Garfield et al., Health
Reform and the Scope of Benefits for Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Services, 61
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1081, 1084 (2010) ("If behavioral health benefits available under qualified health
plans are set at those currently available in typical private plans, some services needed by individuals with
mental disorders . .. will be excluded from coverage.").
121. For example, two people are enrolled into two different health plans that have the same actuarial
value. One plan may offer a longer period of coverage for an inpatient stay, but in order to maintain the
same actuarial value offer less prescription drug coverage. Thus, if both people are prescribed the same
drug, one person would get better coverage than the other.
122. Aston, supranote 112.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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medical associations want a strict, bright-line definition of essential health
benefits, while the American Medical Association recommends that "HHS
strike a balance"' 2 5 by using a current example: the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Program.'2 6 Although FEHBP does not have a standard or
minimum benefit package, the plan does "cover[s] hospital, physician,
medical and surgical care."' 27 Moreover, health plans under the FEHBP
have to cover childhood immunizations, mental-health services, and must
use "evidence-based guidelines for preventive care."' 28
Employers and health insurance companies are worried about
providing too many benefits because it will cost more for enrollees,'29 and
according to the ACA, once an individual's insurance cost exceeds eight
percent of their gross income, the individual mandate no longer applies.'3 0
Thus, individuals are priced out of the requirement to have insurance,
which defeats a primary purpose of the ACA: covering the over thirty-two
million uninsured. '3'
In order to promote both ethics and economics, the definition of
essential health benefits must have an assortment of health plan options
with an array of benefits and cost-sharing levels that allow for adequate
consumer choice.'32 This solution addresses ethical concerns by allowing
for consumer choice amongst an array of provided benefits. The array is
especially important because the definition of essential health benefits is
only one part of a package design of benefits: enumerated benefits.133 A
key component of enumerated benefits-medical necessity-is still, at this
point, determined by the health plan.'34 Thus, an array of benefits is
125. The AMA is not really striking much of a balance because the FEHBP is an employer-sponsored
health-insurance program; thus, this balance tips in favor of the employers and health insurance companies.
For more on the drawbacks of the FEHBP, see infra notes 209-27 & accompanying text.
126. Aston, supranote 112.
127. Id. (quoting Gerald E. Harmon, MD., a member of the AMA Council of Medical Service).
128. Id.
129. Id ("The big issue that came out is the more generous you make the benefits, the more expensive it
will be, and if it's mere expensive, perhaps access to insurance will be less,' said John Ball, MD, chair of
the lOM committee."); Id. ("It would be a mistake to curtail flexibility for the consumer and employers by
requiring all plans to cover a soup-to-nuts benefit package when many employers and consumers prefer a
more bare-bones plan and the moderate price it affords.") (quoting Jerry Malooley, Director of Benefit
Programs and Health Policy for the Indiana Personnel Dept., on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
130. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 5000A(e)(l)(A), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010). The individual mandate requires most individuals who are not on a public insurance program to
either have private health insurance of pay a penalty. Id § 1501.
131. Robert J. O'Neil, Breaking Down the Affordable Care Act, THE NAT'L L. REv., June 11, 2010,
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/breaking-down-affordable-care-act; Snyder, Nix & Yeung, supra
note 5, at 1.
132. Aston, supra note 112.
133. Snyder, Nix & Yeung, supranote 3, at 5.
134. Ann essential health benefit may still be denied if not medically necessary. Aston, supra note 112.
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necessary because an inflexible definition will lead to consistency issues.
The solution addresses economic concerns by allowing for cost-sharing
and an assortment of health plans. This permits insurers to spread risk
amongst plans, which helps keep both premiums and costs down."'
B. Health Insurance Exchanges
All health plans that are part of the health insurance exchanges must
meet the definition of essential health benefits. The section explores these
exchanges. Section 1311 of the ACA requires that each state establish an
"American Health Benefit Exchange" and a "Small Business Health
Options Program Exchange" to facilitate the purchase of "qualified health
plans"' 36 by eligible individuals and small businesses.' 3 1 In other words,
the exchanges are "web-based clearinghouses that will allow eligible
consumers to shop for and purchase 'qualified health plans' from private
Section 1311 also lays out the many
and no-profit insurers."l38
requirements"' and functions'4 0 that an exchange must meet to qualify.
Therefore, providers are concerned that certain that certain procedures will not be covered and that some
health insurers require procedures to be "supported by randomized, controlled studies." Id.; see also
Snyder, Nix & Yeung, supra note 5, at 3. Moreover, health plans still must design enumerated exclusions
and coverage determinations. Id.
135. See, e.g., What's in Healthcare Reform for Small Businesses?, SMALL Bus. MAJORITY, Aug. 12,
2010, http://www.smallbusinessmajority.org/_docs/resources/SBM-whats-initfor-small biz.pdf.
136. A "Qualified Health Plan" is a health plan that meets criteria for certification by HHS, provides
essential health benefits, and is offered by an insurer that is "licensed and in good standing," offers a
health plan at the silver and at the gold level, "charge[s] the same premium rate for each qualified health
plan," and generally complies with all regulations. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1301,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
137. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1311; Frank Micciche & Cindy Gillespie, Health
Insurance Exchange Functions Under PPACA, 16 BNA Health Insurance Report, I (July 14, 2010); see
also White House,
Frequently
Asked
Questions
About Health
Insurance
Reform,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/realitycheck/faq#il (last visited June 4, 2011) ("The health insurance exchange
is a marketplace that will offer affordable high-quality health insurance options. It will provide relief to
families who have no insurance or do not get adequate insurance at work and cannot afford to buy it in the
costly individual or small group market. It is also for small businesses that cannot afford small group health
insurance. It is one-stop shopping that will enable you and your family to find a plan that is right for you.").
138. Micciche & Gillespie,supra note at 137.
139. The requirements include offering qualified health plans, additional rules for any benefits beyond
essential health benefits offered, functions, limitations on funding, consultation with stakeholders, and
publication of costs. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1311(d).
140. The functions include:
Certification, recertification and decertification of plans; [o]peration of a toll-free hotline; [m]aintenance of
a website for providing information on plans to current and prospective enrollees; [a]ssignment of a price
and quality rating to plans; [p]resentation of plan benefit options in a standardized format; [pirovision of
information on Medicaid and CHIP eligibility and determination of eligibility for individuals in these
programs; [p]ovision of an electronic calculator to determine the actual cost of coverage taking into account
eligibility for premium tax credits and cost sharing reductions; [c]ertification of individuals exempt from
the individual responsibility requirement; [p]rovision of information on certain individuals and to
employers; and [e]stablishment of a Navigator program that provides grants to entities assisting consumers.
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This section explores the ethics and economics of the exchanges.
1. Ethics
Ethically, the health insurance exchanges reflect the ethical principles
of consistency, participation, and transparency.' 4' First, consistency is
reflected in these Exchanges because, overall, the exchanges provide the
opportunity that all Americans are treated in the same manner in regards to
receiving health carel42 especially employers who have economically poor
employees.143 They help overcome "nonfinancial barriers" in getting
benefits coverage by not allowing state insurance laws to exclude
"individuals with preexisting conditions or high medical costs.144 Second,
participation is one of the requirements that exchanges must have in order
to be qualified.'45 The statute requires an exchange to "consult with
stakeholders."l 46 The requirement of "advocates for enrolling hard to
reach populations" is important because this specific stakeholder can help
counter the skewing of decisions to the majority of beneficiaries.' 47
Third, the exchanges are also on the right track as far as the ethical
principle of transparency.14 The exchanges are required to publish their
administrative costs (e.g., licensing and regulatory fees) and their losses
due to waste, fraud, and abuse."' Additionally, the publication must be

Initial Guidance to State on Exchanges, HHS Office of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight,
HHS.GOv, http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/guidance-to-states-on-exchanges.html (last visited June
2, 2011); see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1311 (d)(4).
141. See generally supra Part La.
142. Health InsuranceExchange: Implementation and Data Considerationsfor States and Existing Models
for Comparison, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. 1 (2010) (stating that the exchanges help achieve the
goal of "increas[ing] access to and facilitat[ing] the purchase of affordable health insurance").
143. More Money, Fewer Problems, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 4, 2009, http.//www.amaassn.org/amednews/2009/04/06/gvcaO4O6.htm("It is much easier for wealthier Americans to get employersponsored health insurance.... [O]nly 69% of workers earning less than 400% of the federal poverty level
are offered coverage through their employer, while 93% of those at 400% or more are.") (citing U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-252, STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM: CMS
SHOULD IMPROVE EFFORTS TO ACCESS WHETHER SCHIP Is SUBSTITUTING FOR PRIVATE INSURANCE
(2009)).
144. Mark Merlis, A Health Insurance Exchange: Prototypes and Design Issues, NAT'L HEALTH POLICY
FORUM, Issue Brief 832, at 2, June 5, 2009, available at http://www.nhpf.org/library/issuebriefs/IB832 HealthExchange 06-05-09.pdf.
145. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1311 (d)(6), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
146. Id. The list of required stakeholders include individuals who are enrolled in qualified health plans,
individuals and entities who are experienced in "facilitating enrollment in qualified health plans[;]"
"representatives of small businesses and self-employed individuals; State Medicaid offices; and advocates
for enrolling hard to reach populations." Id.
147. Wynia et al., supra note 2, at 97; Merlis, supra note 144.
148. Id at 90.
149. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1311 (d)(7).
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online and must "educate consumers on such costs."'o The cost reporting,
however, does not include coverage decisions or how new services should
be covered."' In other words, it does not address the ethical concerns
regarding benefit administration.
2. Economics
The biggest potential benefit from economics is its ability to
"facilitate[e] comparison shopping for coverage"l5 2 and "to create an
organized and fair market to attract and retain customers."'"

Moreover,

the exchanges will "increase flexibility, portability, and transparency, and
lower cost by enhancing competition" which will "lower costs for

consumers."

54

The exchanges will lower costs for all the stakeholders by increasing
competition among insurers through comparison shopping and informed
consumers, and by providing leverage to small businesses through the
pooling of individuals.' 55 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that
the exchanges will lower administrative overhead by four to five
percent.156 In addition to lowering administrative costs, premiums have
been estimated to decrease by $2,000 per family by 2019'" and employerbased insurance could see a decrease of $3,000 per employee by 2019.'
Specifically, if all of the provisions of the ACA were implemented in
2010, small businesses (i.e., less than 100 employees) would see an overall
decrease of $9.3 billion in employer costs' for health insurance.' 0
150. Id ; see also Timothy S. Jost, Health Insurance Exchanges and the Affordable Care Act: Eight
Difficult
Issues,
THE
COMMONWEALTH
FUND,
at
7,
(Sept.
2010),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2010/Sep/1444 Jost hlti
nsexchangesACA eight difficult-issues v2.pdf ("Exchanges should develop rating systems that permit
accurate comparison of the value of competing health plans, and satisfaction-survey programs that pay
particular attention to the opinions of plan members who have serious health problems or financial
problems related to their health needs.").
151. Wynia, supranote 2, at 90.
152. Health InsuranceExchange, supra note 142.
153. Id
154. Robin Richardson, Health Insurance Exchanges: Variation in State Efforts, AM. ACADEMY OF
FAMILY PHYSICIANS, 1 (2010).
155. Health Insurance Exchange Establishment Grant Facts, HEALTHCARE.Gov, Jan. 20, 2011,
http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/exchestannc.html.
156. Karen Davis et al., Starting on the Path to a High Performance Health System: Analysis of the
Payment and System Reform Provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2011, at ix
(2010). Administrative costs make up about 6.6% of the total expenditures in the United States' health-care
system. NHE Web Tables, supra note 39.
157. Davis, supranote 156, at 35.
158. Id. (internal citations omitted).
159. Employer costs includes premium contribution, employer subsidies, assessments, and vouchers.
Bowen Garrett & Matthew Buettgens, Employer-Sponsored Insurance Under Health Reform: Reports of Its
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Exchanges will lower costs, but self-interest will always loom.
Insurers, in their own economic self-interest, may "compete on their
ability to select the healthiest enrollees, rather than on efficiency or
quality""6 ' in a process called "cream-skimming."l62 Exchanges also put
insurers into "direct head-to-head competition for [a] standardized
product[,]"' 63 giving consumers the ability to switch to a "different health
plan during every open enrollment period."l64 Not many insurers would
like to be in this situation.' In addition, insurers are already selling on an
individual market with their economies of scale already in place.'66 Thus,
adding health plans for the exchanges will have high administrative and
marketing costs.' 67 Furthermore, insurance agents make money off of
commissions and may refuse to promote Exchanges or direct clients to a
plan on the individual market to increase their own fees."'
The ACA does not include a public option in the exchanges. It does,
however, require the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which
administers the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), to
contract with private insurers to offer at least two multi-state plans in each
exchange, including at least one offered by a non-profit entity.'69

Demise are Premature, ROBERT
WOOD
JOHNSON
FOUND.,
Jan.
2011,
at
4,
Assessments, under the
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412295-Employer-Sponsored-Insurance.pdf
ACA, occur when "workers independently buy[ ] subsidized insurance through nongroup exchanges." Id. at
1. These assessments would hit medium firms, those that have 100 to 1,000 employees, especially hard,
with costs actually increasing. Id. at 3.
160. Id. at 4. The decrease is "largely due to the introduction of health insurance exchanges for [smallbusiness] employers." Id.
161. Merlis, supra note 144; see also Wicks et al., Barriers to Small-Group Purchasing Cooperatives,
ECON. & Soc. RES. INST., at 10 (2000) ("Health plans particularly do not like [health exchanges]'
employee-choice feature because they do not get the whole group, with its range of high- and low-risk
individuals, they fear they will get just the less healthy individuals.").
162. Cream-skmming occurs when insurers are "able to 'rig' the incentive structure so as to encourage
selectively the patronage of certain kinds of 'desirable' insureds (e.g., the healthiest or lowest risks)." Peter
Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1253
(2004).
163. Wicks et al., supranote 161.
164. Elliot Wicks, Health Insurance PurchasingCooperatives,ECON. & SOC. RES. INST. 4 (2002).
165. Id. (stating that health plans are hostile to these types of arrangements because it "gives their
customers bargaining clout"); Wicks et al., supra note 161.
166. See Wicks et al., supra note 161; Wicks, supra note 164, at 2, 4 (discussing how private insurers
prefer to get and retain an entire employee group outside the exchange).
167. Merlis, supra note 144. Plans will incur extra costs because "they have to change their administrative
systems to accommodate the administrative structure of the [exchange]." Wicks, supra note 161.
168. See Wicks et al., supra note 161, at 11 (discussing the downfall of state Exchanges being due in part
to "indifferent or hostile" insurance agents).
169. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1333(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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III. FEHBP

This section explores the FEHBP including its history, its constant
flirtation with health care reform, and its positives and negatives.
A. Background

The FEHBP is the largest employer-sponsored health-insurance
program in the world.' It covers over nine million individuals including
"[flederal employees, retirees, former employees, family members, and
former spouses.""' The Program was created by Public Law 86-382,172
which was enacted on September 28, 1959, and currently, is governed by
chapter 89 of title 5 of the United States Code."' The statute allows the
OPM to promulgate any regulations necessary to carry out the Act.174
These regulations are found in two places in the Code of Federal
Regulations: part 890 of title 5 and chapter 16 of title 48."' The FEHBP
has over 90 health plans' 6 with two types of enrollment: Self Only and
Self and Family."' Federal employees can change their health plan during
the "open season," which occurs annually during the later part of the
calendar year."'
In short, OPM negotiates and enters into contracts with various
private health insurance carriers (e.g., Blue Cross and Blue Shield)
including Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) to provide coverage
of health benefits. Then, federal employees get to choose which health
plan best suites them and/or their family. This choice depends on the cost
170. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM HANDBOOK 1
(2010).
171. Id.
172. Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-382, 73 Stat. 708 (2010) (codified at
5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914).
173. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., supra note 170; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914.
174. 5 U.S.C. § 8913. The statute and regulations gives OPM "enormous discretion" to run the FEHBP
with the "power to negotiate benefits packages and premiums annually with plans" and "suggest ways for
plans to contain costs as the craft their proposals and premium requirements." Madhu Chugh, Executive
Authority to Reform Health: Options and Limitations, O'NEILL INST. PAPERS, at 14, n.102 (2009),
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.eduloispapers/22.
175. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., supra note 170; see also 5 C.F.R. 890.101-890.1308; 48 C.F.R.
§§ 1601-1699 (Office of Personnel Management Federal Employees Health Benefits Acquisition
Regulation).
176. For comparisons sake, back in September 1967, CSC/OPM offered thirty-six plans to more than seven
million individuals. Louis S. Reed, Medicare and Federal Employees Health Benefits Programs: Their
Coordinationfrom Social Security Bulletin, 31 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 1, 4 (Sept. 1968), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v3ln9/v3ln9p3.pdf. In addition, premium rates were capped at $3.64
per month for single-only and $8.88 for self-and-family coverage. Id.
177. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., supra note 170, at 3.
178. Id.
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of premiums, coverage of certain benefits or prescription drugs, what
doctors are in-network, etc. Each insurance carrier charges a different
premium amount, 7 9 and payment of this premium is split in between the
government, who generally covers around seventy-five percent, and the
employee, who covers the rest.'s OPM withholds approximately four
percent of all premiums paid.'"' This amount serves the purpose of being a
reserve that can be used for a variety of purposes: to "offset a plan's losses
[when] medical claims spending exceeds projections,"l 82 "to reduce an
otherwise unusually large annual increase,"' or to "avoid benefits [from
being] cut."' 84
In regards to the administration of health benefits, OPM and carriers
negotiate in a bilateral process,'8 5 which is equivalent to private sector
negotiation.'86 Both must approve the final contract, which includes
agreeing upon what benefits are covered.'
Additionally, OPM and
carriers prepare a brochure that is "intended to be a complete statement of
benefits available to the enrollee, including the plan's benefits, limitations,
and exclusions."' The benefit packages vary due to being developed by

179. Premiums are established either by experience rating or community rating. Mark Merlis, The Federal
Employees Health Benefits Program: Program Design, Recent Performance, and Implications for
Medicare Reform, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 5 (2003) [hereinafter Merlis KFF]. The premium rate for
experience rating is "based on the individual plan's projected costs for serving FEHBP enrollees in the
coming year[ ] plus a 'service charge' . .. from .5 percent to 1 percent." Id; see also Merlis,supra note 144,
at 6. This projection is based off of "past cost experience" and takes into effect "inflation, benefit changes,
and other factors expected to affect costs." Merlis KFF, supra. On the other hand, the premium rate for
community rating is based off the two HMOs whose "enrollment is closest in size to the plan's FEHBP
enrollment." The community rate is "then adjusted for expected use of medical resources of the FEHBP
group." Id. at 5 (internal quotations omitted); see also Merlis, supra note 144, at 6. "Prices across FEHBP
plans are driven by the mix of enrollees attracted, the precise benefits and provider networks offered, costsharing requirement, and other provisions. Between premiums and cost sharing, enrollee costs can be
substantial." Randall R. Bovbjerg, Lessonsfor Health Reform From the FederalEmployees Health Benefits
Programs,ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. 2 (2009). In general, a "plan's premium negatively affects
satisfaction" among federal employees. Tai-Seale, supranote 71, at 179.
180. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., supra note 170, at 3, 10. This premium split is called the "Fair Share"
formula:
For most employees and annuitants, the Government contribution equals the lesser of: (1) 72 % of amounts
OPM determines are program-wide weighted average of premiums in effect each year, for self only and for
self and family enrollments, respectively, or (2) 75 % of the total premium for the particular plan an
enrollee selects. Id. at 10.
181. Bovbjerg, supra note 179; Merlis, supra note 144, at 6.
182. Bovbjerg, supra note 179.
183. Id.
184. Merlis, supra note 1449, at 6.
185. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., supranote 170, at 3.

186. See supra note 48 & accompanying text.
187. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., supranote 170, at 3.

188. Id. at 3-4.
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the carriers who are "each seeking to attract enrollees."'" Still, OPM
requires a baseline of services for all plans,190 it requires particular
benefits, and has "eliminated plans [which] provided substandard
coverage.""' Furthermore, any health plan that is a part of the FEHBP
cannot have any waiting periods or exclusions for preexisting
conditions.192
Overall, FEHBP has been seen as "successful," with the ability to
modernize benefit design while curbing premium increases.' This section
explores why the FEHBP is a success, why this success makes politicians
constantly flirt with the FEHBP as a solution to all health care's problems,
and why the FEHBP may not be quite the success as perceived. In
addition, this section examines the future OPM plans in the health
insurance exchanges, the positives, the previous state exchange failures,
and how to overcome these failures in the new exchanges.
B. Successful and Flirtatious
FEHBP is seen as a success because of its ability to spread risk over a
large population of individuals' 94 without having its premiums riskadjusted.'95 Insurers who participate in the FEHBP "can't turn anyone
down,"'9 6 have to "structure benefit packages with extreme precision to
attract the widest possible mix of ages and conditions,"l9 and are "limited
Federal
in how much profit they can make under the program."'
employees receive good benefits with a wide choice of plans. 19 They do
189. Bovbjerg, supra note 179; see also Chugh, supranote 174. FEHBP's benefits must include "both for
costs associated with care in a general hospital and for other health services of a catastrophic nature." 5
U.S.C. § 8904(a) (2011).
190. Chugh, supranote 1749.
191. Merlis, supra note 144, at 16.
192. Bovbjerg, supranote 179.
193. Curtis S. Florence et al., Will Choice-BasedReform Work for Medicare? Evidence from the Federal
Employees Health Benefits Program, 41 HEALTH SERV. RES. 1741, 1742-43 (2006) (internal citations
omitted).
194. See Reed Abelson, Health Plan Used by US. Is Debated as a Model, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/20/business/20fedhealth.html?pagewantedprint.
195. Merlis KFF, supra note 179, at 6. Premiums are not risk-adjusted when "the premiums paid to a plan
do not vary by enrollee characteristics, such as age, sex, or health risk." Id. The national plans meet the
Ethical Force Progam's definition of consistency because they "do not vary according to where an enrollee
is located either." Id.
196. Shailagh Murray, Why Health Insurancethat Works Still Fails to Catch on Broadly, WALL ST. J., Jan.
18, 2000, http://www.burtonreport.com/infhealthcare/FedEmpHIthBen.htm; see also Bovbjerg, supra note
179.
197. Murray, supra note 196.
198. Abelson, supra note 194. "[A]nything above those amounts is put in reserves used to keep average
premium increases lower than they would otherwise be." Id.
199. Bovbjerg, supra note 179, at 1.
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not have to fear being rejected or treated differently based on their health
status or age. 200 Furthermore, these plans are portable to any federal job
and into retirement.201
FEHBP is also a success because OPM has great negotiating
power.202 In addition, OPM, with over fifty years of experience, consists
of subject-matter experts in the field with the ability to manage excess
costs, to insure control over each carrier, and to identify problems.203
Furthermore, the statutes and regulations that administer the FEHBP are
more generous than other insurance laws, including preemption from state
benefit rules.2 " Taken as a whole, the FEHBP transforms the health-care
system into a consumer's market and "promotes consumer-friendly
competition,"205 neither of which are seen in the health-care market.206
Because of this success, politicians have flirted with the FEHBP as
the solution to the United States' health-care problems and as the
minimum benefit package every American should have 0 . because it has
appealing characteristics to both parties.
"Conservatives like the
program's reliance on private health plans and market competition.
Liberals like the prospect of expanding to everyone the FEHBP's large200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Chugh, supra note 174.
203. See McIlroy, supranote 41, at 17, 25. Employers, in dealing with insurance carriers, generally need
to acquire expertise in managing health plans because "insurance carriers are primarily financial transfer
agents." Id at 17. When employers fail, it can lead "to identify problems or an inability to analyze
excessive costs." Id. at 25.
204. 5 U.S.C. 8902(m); Merlis, supra note 144, at 20 ("[A]uthorizing law for the FEHBP exempts
contracts for coverage of federal employees from state benefit rules."); Id at 27, n. 36 ("In practice, OPM
exercises the preemption for the national plans, while local HMOs generally comply with the rules in their
states.").
205. Murray, supranote 196.
206. Id.
207. In the early 1990s, Bill Clinton proposed the FEHBP as a "moderate alternative to [his] single-payer
plan." Murray, supra note 196. In 1994, Al Gore said "If we should have it, you should have it," in
reference to what coverage every American should have. Id. The Health Security Act of 1993 called for
"[o]pening the FEHBP to the general public." Id. In the presidential campaign in 2000, Bill Bradley had an
"ambitious health-care policy that would open the FEHB program to all adults, especially Medicaid
recipients and uninsured people." Id. In 2003, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and
Modernization Act of 2003 was passed with "[o]ne of the major models of this legislation was the
[FEHBP]." Id Also in 2003 was the Small Business Health Fairness Act of 2003 which "[r]equire[d] the
Department of Labor to establish a Small Employer Health Benefits Plan (SEHB) similar to the Federal
Employees Health Benefits Plan (FEHBP)." H.R. REP. 108-160, H.R. Rep. No. 160, 108TH Cong., IST
Sess. 2003, 2003 WL 21403718 (legislation failed). On the 2008 campaign trail, Hillary Clinton stated
that "[tihe American people should have access to the same array of health care choices and benefits as the
senators and representatives they elect." Abelson, supra note 194. Barack Obama and John Edwards both
"made similar proposals to expand the [FEHBP)." Id The Affordable Care Act requires OPM to
administer state exchanges in likeness to the FEHBP. Id. In 2011, Republican, Paul D. Ryan suggested "A
Medicare system that works exactly like the health care I have as a member of Congress and federal
employees have." Reinhardt, supra note 103.
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employer-style benefits, community rating, and close oversight of insurer

pricing." 208
C. Or is It Successful?
To start off, the FEHBP has been misperceived. 209 The general
impression of the FEHBP as such a generous system with great benefits is
"colored by years of news about presidential and congressional care at
military hospitals or the Congressional health clinic."2 10 This care received
by these politicians is not paid for by the FEHBP; it is separately funded.21'
Furthermore, the FEHBP does not have any public purchasing power; "[i]t
simply helps enrollees buy private insurance and is thus quite different
from public coverage. "212

The benefits provided by the FEHBP fall short of "large private plans
in actuarial value."213 Also, in comparing premiums, FEHBP enrollees
often have a higher share than employees of large private plans.2 14 This
higher premium amount can be seen by the 100,000 federal workers, about
five percent of the active workforce, who do not have a FEHBP plan
208. Bovbjerg, supra note 179. Even if the FEHBP was implemented on an open, national market, it still
would not address the nation's runaway medical costs. Abelson, supra note 194. In addition, the Program
would "play such a big role in the insurance market" that it would "become less flexible and require greater
regulation than it does now." ld.; see also Murray, supra note 196.
209. See infra text accompanying notes 210-227.
210. Bovbjerg, supranote 179, at 5.
211. Id.; Phil Scott, What Kinds of Benefits Does Really Get?, AARP BULL., Dec. 15, 2010,
http://www.aarp.org/work/employee-benefits/info-12-2010/benefits-what-does-congressreallyget.html
("For an annual payment of $503, members can receive routine care from the Office of the Attending
Physician, which has facilities in the Capitol . . . and include[s] physicals and other examinations, on-site
X-rays and lab work, physical therapy and referrals to medical specialists. In addition, current members
(but not their dependents) can receive medical and emergency dental care at military hospitals and clinics.
Inpatient care is covered by FEHBP insurance, but outpatient care is free if it's performed at facilities in the
national capital region, such as Bethesda Naval Hospital in Maryland or Walter Reed Army Medical Center
in the District of Columbia.").
212. Bovbjerg, supra note 179, at 6 (italics omitted). Thus, the enrollees of the FEHBP run into the same
issues any other enrollee of a private health insurance plan; for example, the denial of benefits because
services are not covered or the services do not meet contractual definitions. Burgin v. OPM, 120 F.3d 494
(4th Cir. 1997) (exclusion in the Plan for "'custodial care, rest cures, domiciliary or convalescent care.");
Colicchio v. OPM,2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10918 (D. Md. Feb. 3, 2011) (denying allograft surgery for not
being medically necessary); Murray, supra note 196 ("Rep. Jim McDermott, Washington State, had a
friend whose wife had cancer and the recommended treatment wasn't covered under his friends plan for the
policy in the region, but 'it was covered in other parts of the country."').
213. Bovbjerg, supra note 179, at 3. Benefit levels do "exceed those of most small employer groups or
individuals buying on their own." Id. Actuarial value is "the percentage of the total covered expenses that
the plan would, on average, cover. For example, a plan with a 70% actuarial value means that consumers
would on average pay 30% of the cost of health care expenses through features like deductibles and
KAISER
FAMILY
FOUND.,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
coinsurance."
http://healthreform.kff.org/SubsidyCalculator/Faq.aspx (last visited June 5, 2011).
214. Bovbjerg, supranote 179, at 3.
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because even the cheapest option is still not affordable.215 Moreover, the
federal health benefits "have evolved to serve a population that is older
and has substantially higher incomes than the uninsured."2 16
The main drawback of the FEHBP is adverse selection. Adverse
selection describes the process by which enrollees "utilize private
knowledge of their own riskiness when deciding to buy or forgo
insurance."2 17 The economic self-interest of each individual trumps the
ethical principle of consistency and creates not so similar decisions in
similar circumstances.218 For example, if an enrollee knows that they are
going to have knee surgery next year, during FEHBP's open season, that
individual would choose a health plan that offers better coverage for that
surgery and the corresponding physical therapy.219 Theoretically, as these
and other individuals leave a health plan, the quality of enrollees falls,
prices rise, and the dreaded "death spiral" occurs where no one is
covered.220 This process has occurred with some of the FEHBP's health
plans.22' For example, in the 1980s, a significant amount of enrollees all
went to the Blue Cross High Option, which provided the best coverage for
mental health services, from the Blue Cross Standard Option.222 Blue
215. Abelson, supra note 194.
216. Bovbjerg, supra note 179, at 6.
217. Siegelman, supra note 162, at 1223; see also DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
EVALUATION OF PARITY IN THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS (FEHB) PROGRAM: FINAL

REPORT, Dec. 2004, at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/parity.pdf; NORTHROP GRUMMAN INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, INC. ET AL., EVALUATION OF PARITY IN THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS
(FEHB) PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT, Dec. 31 2004, http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/parity.pdf.
218. Wynia, supra note 2, at 90.
219. See Bovbjerg, supra note 179, at 4 ("Under any multiple-choice system, one or more plans may
disproportionately attract people who are older or sicker than average-for example, by offering easier
access to specialists or other difference in benefits. Then such a plan must charge above-average
premiums, which in turn encourages people whose premiums are not below average to leave, thus raising
premiums for the remaining people, which drives away yet more people.").
220. Siegelman, supra note 162, at 1223-24; Bovbjerg, supra note 179, at 4 (discussing how adverse
selection "make[s] the plan unsustainable, whether or not it provides better or more efficient care, given the
particular mix of health risks within its enrolled population"); Merlis, supra note 144, at 11 ("In time, the
exchange could fall into a 'death spiral,' serving a dwindling pool of high-risk enrollees with very high
premium rates.").
221. Norman Carleton, A Note on the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program - A Model for
Medicare?,

WASH.

OUTSIDE

(Apr.

19,

2011,

11:18

AM),

("In the
http://washingtonoutside.blogspot.com/2011/04/note-on-federal-employee-health-benefit.html
1980s, Blue Cross offered a high and low option plan under the FEHBP. Over time, the risk profile of the
group covered by the high option plan became much worse than those in the low option plan. Blue Cross
had to increase the premiums for the high option plan rather dramatically at times because of this. The
increase in premiums caused a further migration from the high to the low option plan, thus exacerbating the
difference in the risk characteristics of the two populations. Eventually, the risk profile of the high option
plan became so bad and costs escalated so much that Blue Cross dropped it."); Stuart M. Butler & Robert
E. Moffit, The FEHBP as a Model for a New Medicare Program, 14 HEALTH AFF. 47, 51 (1995)
(describing adverse selection as being an "irritant" to the FEHBP).
222. NORTHROP GRUMMAN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INC. ET AL., supra note 217 ("For example, in
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Cross dropped the option and enrollees incurred a distorted premium
contribution. 22 3 However, enrollees in the FEHBP will receive coverage on
a different plan.224
Another interesting characteristic of the FEHBP is how the large
population of individuals covered by the FEHBP is divided into different
tranches of risk; i.e., "separate risk pools, with different characteristics."225
While not necessarily a negative, it can create disproportionate amount in
premiums with the "young choos[ing] cheap HMO's [and] the older
individuals choos[ing] more expensive plans to provide better benefits."2 26
If there is enough migration from one tranche to another, it can cause one
or more plans to become too expensive to maintain.22 7
IV. THE OPM PLANS
If these issues exist now, how should the OPM plans for the
Exchanges address these concerns and what can be learned from other
state exchange failures? This section explores these issues, addresses
other issues, and makes recommendations going forward.
Section 1334 of the ACA requires that OPM create at least two multistate qualified health plans for each Exchange. 22 8 The health plans must be
administered "in a manner similar to the manner in which the Director [of
OPM] implements the contracting provisions with respect to carriers under

the early 1980s, the use of mental health services was two to three times higher in the FEHB Program's
Blue Cross High Option plan than its standard option, even though only minor differences existed in the
actuarial value of benefits in the two options.").
223. Merlis, supra note 144, at 17.
224. See Butler & Moffit, supra note 221 ("[Adverse selection] has not undermined the program. Indeed,
after exhaustive analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the FEHBP, the Congressional Research
Service (CSR) concluded that the program is structurally sound. According to the CRS, 'That FEHBP has
continued to "work" over the years, despite major changes in the environment in which it has operated,
reflects on the soundness of its basic design."') (internal citations omitted); Roger Feldman, Brian Dowd &
Robert Coulam, The Federal Employee Health Benefits Plan: Implications on Medicare Reform, 36
INQUIRY 188, 188 (1999) ("[T]he FEHBP has experienced some selection problems, but not enough to
prevent it from offering a wide variety of choices without standardized benefits or direct risk adjustment.").
225. Carleton, supra note 221; see also Mark A. Hall, Risk Adjustment Under the Affordable Care Act: A
Guide for Federal and State Regulators, COMMONWEALTH FUND, at 5 (2011) ("Uneven risk distribution
can happen randomly, through natural consumer preferences, or via strategic insurer behavior.").
226. Carleton, supranote 221.
227. See Siegelman, supra note 162, at 1257. Professor Siegelman discusses Harvard University's health
plans, where due to a contribution change to the health plans, "younger, lower-risk employees" switched to
HMOs over to a Preferred Provider Organization (PPO). Id. The enrollment for the PPO fell by seventyfive percent in three years and premiums increased fivefold. Id. The PPO had to be "withdrawn
altogether." Id. With the FEHBP, an inverse to the Harvard situation happened with HMOs in the late
1990s. Murray, supra note 196. HMOs where priced out by fee-for-service plans with more than 100
programs leaving. Id.
228. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1334, Pub. L.No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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the [FEHBP]." 22 9 Additionally, the benefit package for any plan in these
exchanges must be "uniform in each State and consists of the essential
[health] benefits."230
Ethically, these OPM plans meet the general consistency and
participation goals that are required of essential health benefits.
Economically, the OPM plans will have the general benefits of being a
part of an Exchange.232 This section examines the additional positive
impact these plans have on the economics of the administration of health
benefits; discusses the potential problems these plans face both ethically
and economically; briefly explores past state exchange failures and what
can be learned from them; and makes recommendations as to how to
handle some of the bigger issues.
A. Positives
Economically, the OPM plans will help lower administrative costs to
individuals and employers. Small businesses do not have to pay the startup costs of having an enrollment program. The economy of scale involved
in implementing a benefit administration program is greatly reduced
because these exchanges and OPM's FEHBP already has electronic
documentation.233 In addition, the start-up costs of the enrollment process,
of communicating with carriers, and with managing the benefits billing
process will be reduced because OPM will be administering these
qualified health plans.234
With over fifty years experience, OPM already has subject-matter
experience built into its health plans.235 Thus, the OPM plans will already
have this experience so issues such as "needing to improve the current way
of monitoring the evidence of insurability process, over-age dependents,
domestic partner requirements" are already handled or resolved before an
individual or small business employee participates in the exchange.236
Employers do not have to have an "active role in managing costs and
services," including the "management of medical benefit financing" and

Id § 1334(a)(4)
Id. § 1334(c)(1)(a)
Supra notes 116-21 & accompanying text.
Supra notes 152-68 & accompanying text.
See Valerie Gieseke, Key Considerationsin Automating health and Welfare Benefits Administration,
37 COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV. 56, 57 (2005).
234. See id at 57-58.
235. See supra note 203 & accompanying text.
236. Gieseke, supra note 233, at 58.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
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B. Problems
A potential ethical problem involves the distribution of information
to, and the counseling of, individuals and small businesses about the OPM
plans. Although OPM administers the FEHBP, each specific agency has
the "responsibility to provide health insurance information and counseling
to its employees[,]" 23 8 i.e., transparency. 239 In addition, any employee
question about the FEHB has to be directed to an agency-specific benefits
Additionally, agency specific
i.e., participation.24
officer,
responsibilities include "develop[ing] contacts with carrier representative
to assist their employees," providing information to employees about their
"rights and responsibilities," determining eligibility of employees and
family members, and processing health benefits actions.242 Furthermore,
each employing agency has, as a part of their agency budget, costs for
these personnel operations.2 43 In other words, OPM pays the start-up costs,
while each agency pays the administrative managing costs.
With the OPM plans, who is going to take on the specific agency
responsibilities? The individual themselves or the employer will have to
take on this responsibility to provide transparent coverage and an ability to
participate. 244 Employers will have to "communicat[e] techniques and
incentives to educate employees to choose quality cost-effective providers,
to understand the medical cost consequences of their lifestyles, and to
position cost sharing in a positive framework."2 45
Furthermore,
decentralized organizations, like some small-businesses (as compared to
the federal government), "often struggle with timely and accurate
termination reporting"24 and can have difficulty with employees who
237. See McIlroy, supra note 41, at 17.
238. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., supranote 170, at 6.

239. See supratext accompanying notes 22-24.
240. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., supranote 170, at 8.

241. See supratext accompanying notes 25-28.
242. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., supra note 170, at 6-7. Other responsibilities include "processing new
enrollments and enrollment changes and collecting and transmitting employee and employer premium
contributions." Merlis, supra note 144, at 7.
243. Id.
244. This statement assumes that OPM will not be taking on these additional responsibilities like the state
of Connecticut has with their small-business exchange. Health Insurance Exchange, supra note 142, at 4
("The Connecticut Business and Industry Association's Health Connections Exchange reduces the
administrative burden for small employers by offering them full-service human resources services, which
has been particularly successful in the less than 25 employee small group market.").
245. Mcllroy, supra note 41, at 17.
246. Gieseke, supranote 233, at 58.
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don't complete the forms properly, on time, or both." 24 7 Thus, although
OPM will defray the start-up. costs of administering a health plan, smallbusiness employers and individuals will have to incur the day-to-day
administrative costs.
Economically, many individuals point to the exchanges, and in effect
the health plans offered, as having the ability to lower premiums and
reduce costs.248 A qualified health plan administered by OPM may not be
the solution. This fact is especially true when only ten percent of 545
employers stated that they would pay $200 a month per employee, while
the other ninety percent would either pay less or nothing at all. 249 Looking
at the 2011 FEHBP's non-postal premium rates,250 the minimum the
government-as an employer-pays for a month of coverage is $252 for a
self-only Aetna consumer-driven health plan251 and tops out at $391 for a
variety of high coverage, self-only plans. 25 2 In regards to self-and-family
plans, the government contribution ranges from $568, for Aetna's
consumer-drive plan, to $875, for high coverage, family plans.25 3 The
contribution to an employee's health plan by the government is higher than
what 90% of employers are willing to pay. Thus, even with reduced costs,
the health plans offered by OPM may not attract employers to the
Exchanges.254
247. Id.
248. See supra notes 152-60 & accompanying text.
249. Cost Seen as Biggest Obstacle to Employer-Offered Insurance, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 1, 2008,
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/12/01/gvcal201.htm (internal citation omitted).
250. Non-Postal Premium Rates for the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program, OFFICE OF
PERSONNEL MGMT., http://www.opm.gov/insure/health/rates/nonpostalffs20l 1.pdf (last visited June 7,
2011).
251. Frequently Asked Questions About Aetna HealthFund Consumer Driven Health Plan (CDHP),
AETNA, http://custom.aetna.com/fehbp/medcdhpfaq.php (last visited June 7, 2011). Generally, consumerdriven health plans consist of a high-deductible plan coupled with a tax savings method: a health
reimbursement arrangement or a heath savings account. Michelle Andrews, High-DeductibleHealth Plans:
For Many Too Costly, U.S. NEWS, Apr. 17, 2008, http://health.usnews.com/health-news/blogs/on-healthand-money/2008/04/17/high-deductible-health-plans-for-many-too-costly; Paul Fronstin & Sara R. Collins,
Early Experience with High-Deductible and Consumer-Driven Health Plans: Findings From the
EBRI/Commonwealth Fund Consumerism in Health Care Survey, EBRI Issue Brief No. 288, at 4 (Dec.
2005),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%/20Brief/2005/Dec/Early%/20Experie

nce%20With%2OHigh%2ODeductible%20and%20Consumer/o2ODriven%2OHealth%20Plans%20%2OFind
ings%20From%20the%20EBRI%2OCommo/fronstinconsumerism survey%2Opdf.pdf. In order to qualify
for the tax savings, the deductible has to be at least $1,000 for individuals and $2,000 for families.
Andrews, supra. The benefit for CDHPs are that they have lower premiums. Id.
252. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., supranote 250.
253. Id.
254. See Wicks, supra note 164, at 5 ("Even if [Exchanges] could offer lower premiums, they could not
substantially reduce the number of uninsured because the premium reductions would not be big enough to
induce large numbers of uninsured employers and uninsured workers to opt for coverage."); Wicks et al.,
supra note 161, at 2 ("There is no convincing evidence that [Exchanges] have had a major impact on
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C. Past Failures
States have implemented health insurance exchanges mostly for small
Examining these exchanges is important because
businesses.255
comparisons and dissimilarities can be drawn between past failures and the
future OPM plans. This section will broadly describe why such exchanges
failed and why the OPM plans may help alleviate future exchange failures.
Generally, state exchanges have failed because of an inability to gain
market share256 which causes the exchanges to not achieve the necessary
"economies of scale or gain[ ] the bargaining power that would allow them
to offer lower-cost coverage."257 Without this power, exchanges cannot
attract or retain health plans.2 58 In addition, with no mandate of parity on
the insurers' side, state exchanges failed because insurers would "cherry
pick" the healthiest individuals by offering them cheaper plans outside of
the exchange,259 while dumping high-risk or -cost individuals into the
exchange; thus, creating ever-rising premiums.260 With rising premiums,
the health plans are no longer a bargain, employers start backing away,
and soon, insurers will follow.26'
The OPM plans and the ACA will help alleviate these concerns and
may be able to keep exchanges afloat as they gain market share. Health
insurers are familiar with OPM-administered FEHBP plans and have dealt
reducing the number on uninsured.").
255.
Frank Micciche, A FairExchange, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010, (opinion) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07
/28/opinion/28micciche.html. In addition, states will have to create their own Exchanges by 2014. Id.
256. See generally Wicks et al., supra note 161. Enrollment has been large in some state exchanges,
California at 150,000 and Florida at 92,000, but this great influx caused a rapid drop in enrollment. Id at 2.
Yet, the Connecticut Business and Industry Association's Health Connections is still going strong with its
75,000 members as of 2010. Health InsuranceExchange, supra note 142 at 8, tbl. 1.
257. State Health Insurance Purchasing Alliances and Cooperatives, Nat'l Conference of State
Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=18905 (last updated May 2011) (stating that
Exchanges have "insignificant market penetration due to the inability to offer health insurance at lower
price than offered in the broader small group market").
258. Wicks, supra note 164, at 3-4.
259. North Carolina's exchange failed, in part, because "healthy groups purchased less expensive policies
outside the exchange." Richardson, supra note 154, at 12. The exchange also had too small of enrollment,
had low insurer participation, had choice problems among health plans for employees, and did not have any
quality comparison measures, State Health Insurance, supra note 257.
260. Micciche, supra note 255. This cherry picking was a significant factor in the downfall of Texas's state
exchange. Cappy McGarr, Opinion, A Texas-Sized Health Care Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/06/opinion/06megarr.html?ref-opinion. ("Private insurance companies,
which could offer small-business policies both inside and outside the exchange, cherry-picked relentlessly,
signing up all the small businesses with generally healthy employees and offloading the bad risks companies with older or sicker employees - onto the exchange."). Califomia's state exchange failed, in
part, because it was voluntary and not the exclusive source of coverage. Richardson, supranote 154, at I1;
State Health Insurance,supra note 257.
261. McGarr, supranote 260.
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with OPM in contract negotiations. OPM will bring similar bargaining
power to the table with the qualified health plans and know what insurers
will generally cover and for what price. This still may not allow lowercost coverage, but will give the exchanges stability and insurers comfort
that there will be at least two qualified health plans administered from a
reputable source in the exchange market. In other words, the OPM plans
bring credibility to the exchanges.
D. Recommendations
Although the FEHBP has been successful, some individual health
plans, as a part of the FEHBP, have been discontinued due to adverse
selection and improper risk adjustment. This section addresses these
concerns and makes recommendations for the OPM plans.
Adverse selection has occurred in the FEHBP health plans.262 It will
also occur in the OPM plans because OPM is directed to administer theses
plans "in a manner similar" to the FEHBP."26 3 In order to avoid rising
premiums," creating a high-risk pool exchange,265 and motivating younger
individuals to opt for insurance outside of the exchange,2 66 tax subsidies or
credits need to be provided.267
The United States tax system provides subsidies on health care.268
Tax subsidies and credits can reduce adverse selection by "encouraging

262. See supra notes 217-224 and accompanying text.
263. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1334(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
264. Bovbjerg, supra note 179, at 4.
265. Merlis, supra note 144, at I1.
266. Bovbjerg, supra note 179, at 4.
267. Another recommendation that could potentially lower the impact of adverse selection would be to
have a qualified health plan be a consumer-driven health plan (CDHP). "The introduction of new benefits
in the form of consumer-directed, high-deductible plans seems to be changing the age distribution of
enrollees selecting different plans." Id. at 5. Yet, CDHPs still have their own issues including lower
satisfaction that preferred-provider-organization plans, higher out-of-pocket costs, more missed visits to
physicians, and low levels of trust in the plan itself. Fronstin & Collins, supra note 251, at 1. In addition,
individuals who are uninsured will have difficulty paying the high deductibles. Andrews, supra note 251.
If OPM decides to implement more than the two required qualified health plans, it should consider a CDHP
because of its proven track record to attract younger and healthier individuals. See U.S. GOv'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-616, CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH PLANS: HEALTH STATUS,
SPENDING, AND UTILIZATION OF ENROLLEES IN PLANS BASED ON HEALTH REIMBURSEMENT
ARRANGEMENTS 1 (2010) (finding that eighteen of twenty-one studies reviewed showed that CDHPs

enrollees were healthier based on utilization of healthcare services).
268. Jonathan Gruber & James Poterba, Tax Incentives and the Decision to Purchase Health Insurance:
Evidence from the Self-Employer, 109 Q. J. ECON. 701, 705 (1994). These subsidies include employersponsored health insurance not being taxable as income, 26 U.S.C. § 106 (2011); Gruber & Poterba, supra,
and the ability for individuals to itemize deductions for out-of-pocket health expenditures that exceeds a
threshold percentage of income. 26 U.S.C. §213 (2011); Gruber & Poterba, supra.
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low-risk individuals to participate and seek greater insurance coverage" 269
which "leads to more risk-sharing across types."2 70 Moreover, subsidies
can "offset the price effects of adverse selection" and help compete with
non-exchange plans. 271 The tax subsidy or credit provided in the exchange
must be available only for an exchange.2 72 This point should not be
overlooked because providing a sub-set of an insurance market group with
a subsidy can led to individuals purchasing insurance in that sub-set and to
purchasing more insurance coverage, especially the larger the subsidy.273
The ACA provides such a tax credit for individuals, but not
employer-sponsored plans, which purchase insurance through an
Exchange and meet certain income requirement guidelines. 274 The tax
credit will flow directly to the insurer on the individual's behalf and will
be "based on a maximum amount that recipients will be required to spend
for their monthly premium."275 The credit, by only effecting exchangebased plans, will help fight the problems of adverse selection by keeping
cost lows 276 and by incentivizing exchange-based health plans, a sub-set of
the insurance market, over non-exchange plans.2
A second potential issue involves having different risk profiles and
attempting to risk adjust 278 certain plans in order to prevent their
implosion. 279 The plans in the exchanges will have different risk
269. Rajeev Cherukupalli, Adverse Selection and Subsidies: Evidence from Non-Group Health Insurance
Markets 1 (Oct. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www4.gsb.columbia.edulnull/download?&exclu
sive=filemgr.download&file id=32224.
270. Thomas G. Koch, Optimal Taxation of Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection 2 (Dec. 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~kochlWP/opt tax MI.pdf.
271. Merlis, supra note 144, at 12. But see generally 5.4 at 2-3 ("If insurance leads to modest wasteful
spending, then the optimal subsidy drops significantly.").
272. Bovbjerg, supra note 179, at 4; Merlis, supranote 144, at 12.
273. See generally Cherukupalli, supra note 269; Gruber & Poterba, supra note 268.
274. Micciche & Gillespie, supra note 137, at 2. The credits will be available to "those earning between
133 percent to 400 percent of the Federal Poverty Level," which is approximately $22,500 for a family of
four. Id. at 2, n.3.
275. Id. at 2. "The maximum is set on a sliding scale starting at [three] percent of'modified adjusted gross
income.' For those earning 133 percent [of the Federal Poverty Line] and increasing gradually to 9.5
percent for those between 300 percent to 400 percent [of the Federal Poverty Line]." Id.
276. See Gruber & Poterba, supra note 268, at 701 (finding that a one percent increase in cost of insurance
reduced the probability that a self-employed individual will have insurance by 1.8 percentage points).
277. See Cherukupalli, supranote 269.
278. Risk adjustment is a "method of adjusting capitation payments to health plans, either higher or lower,
to account for the difference in expected costs of individuals." Gregory C. Pope et al., Evaluation of the
CMS-HCC Risk Adjustment Model, RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE INTERNATIONAL 4 (2011), at

https://www.cms.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/downloads/Evaluation RiskAdjModel 2011.
The
ACA already has some risk-adjustment mechanisms including requiring a base-level of health benefits and
requiring insurers to pay the same rate both in and out of the exchanges for individuals and small-group
subscribers. Hall, supra note 225, at 3.
279. See supranotes 225-27 & accompanying text.
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profiles.280 With the distortion of price competition, e.g., healthier
individuals in some plans, sicker individuals in other plans, premium
differences would reflect the "characteristics of their enrolled population"
rather than "relative efficiency."281 In order to have OPM's qualified health
plans reflect their relative efficiency, something akin to Medicare
Advantage should be implemented.
Medicare Advantage, also known as Part C of Medicare, is a
Medicare health plan that is offered by private insurance companies, which
are approved by Centers of Medicaid and Medicare Services.2 82 The plan
provides coverage for hospital and physician services like standard
Medicare and may offer additional coverage.283 Medicare Advantage plans
are paid for by a fix amount from Medicare and by out-of-pocket costs that
differ according to the benefits provided.284 Normally, these plans would
have distortion of price competition; however, "[e]nrollee characteristics
that may predict future costs and utilization are compared across plans."285
Medicare pays the plans with healthier, low-risk populations less than
those with sicker, high-risk populations.2 86 The rates that enrollees see are
of a "typical" participant when making a health plan choice; "[t]he
adjustments are invisible to consumers."2 87 Furthermore, by using this
risk-adjustment method, private plans have less of an incentive to "risk
select" healthy enrollees and plans that provide care for sicker enrollees
are not penalized.288
Although the benefits to this model are immense and proven,289
medical conditions and need for services change over time.290 No one can
perfectly predict the level of risk and the consumer will always have their
own self-interest to look out for.29' Additionally, another problem is that
280. Merlis, supra note 144, at 17.
28 1. Id.
282.
Medicare Advantage, CTRS. FOR MEDICAID & MEDICARE SERVS., http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/m
edicare-basics/medicare-benefits/part-c.aspx (last visited June 11, 2011).
283. Id. Additional coverage may include "vision, hearing, dental, and/or health and wellness programs"
and Medicare Part D for prescription drug coverage. Id.
284. Id.
285. Merlis, supra note 144, at 18. The current risk-adjustment model used by CMS is the Hierarchal
Condition Categories. For more information on this model, see Pope et al., supra note 278, at 4-22. This
model is based off of diagnostic codes rather than demographic measures, which better predicts risks. Hall,
supranote 225, at 1, 6-7.
286. Merlis, supra note 144, at 18; Pope et al., supra note 278, at 2, 5.
287. Merlis, supra note 144, at 18.
288. Pope et al., supra note 278, at 5.
289. See generally Pope et al., supra note 278.
290. Merlis, supra note 144, at 18.
291. Id.
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Medicare, i.e., the government, is controlling the paying mechanism with
Medicare Advantage, while OPM only controls part of the paying
mechanism of the FEHBP and none of the OPM plans. This point is to not
to say that government should not direct tax credits or subsidies by a riskadjustment method, just that it will be a logistical nightmare and out of
OPM's control.292
V. Conclusion
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) helps the administration of health
benefits achieve ethical and economic goals through three provisions: the
definition of "essential health benefits," the implementation of health
insurance exchanges, and the participation of the OPM plans in the
exchanges. Ethically, these three provisions increase transparency,
participation, and consistency by either providing or requiring the
reporting of cost information, the presence of certain stakeholders, and the
ability for more individuals to receive coverage. Economically, the
provisions will attempt to lower cost, to provide stability and credibility to
reform mechanisms, and to alleviate stakeholder's economic self-interest.
Overall, the ACA improves the ethics and economics of the administration
of health benefits, but attention needs to be placed on potential roadblocks
like political punditry, adverse selection, and risk allocation.
Many view the health-care system as unfair. Yet, through an ethical
and economic administration of health benefits, the effectiveness and
value of health care are improved.

292. See Micciche & Gillespie, supra note 137, at 3 (describing how the tax credits for the future
exchanges do not have an "aggregation of premium payments" which will lead to "distinct operational
challenges, disadvantages in attracting insurers, and potential complications for purchases").

